Research
In what follows, I give a thematic overview of my research. To see individual abstracts of my papers, please visit my Publications page, or explore my current projects under Under Review and In Preparation.
My research ranges across normative ethics, moral psychology, political philosophy, and the history of philosophy. I approach these areas by focusing on the normative structure of our interpersonal and institutional relationships. My research agenda for the coming years is organized around (1) the application of my relational theory of trust to the political domain, (2) the development of this foundational theory into a book manuscript, (3) a critique of "normative powers" views in ethics, and (4) the reconstruction of Kant’s conception of friendship and political trust. Below I describe the current and future projects that reflect these themes.
My research ranges across normative ethics, moral psychology, political philosophy, and the history of philosophy. I approach these areas by focusing on the normative structure of our interpersonal and institutional relationships. My research agenda for the coming years is organized around (1) the application of my relational theory of trust to the political domain, (2) the development of this foundational theory into a book manuscript, (3) a critique of "normative powers" views in ethics, and (4) the reconstruction of Kant’s conception of friendship and political trust. Below I describe the current and future projects that reflect these themes.
(1) Trust and Relational Normativity
My dissertation, "A Relational Theory of Trust," exemplifies this theoretical commitment by demonstrating how relationships not only provide the context for trust but fundamentally constitute its normative content. Drawing on Joseph Raz's work on social norms, I argue that relationships are constituted by norms: ways in which we are committed to acting with each other as fellow participants. Trust, thus, implies a belief that our trustees will follow through with such norms, rather than aiming at particular actions. This theory, developed across three stand-alone papers that together form my dissertation, addresses various issues in the trust literature.
The first, "Navigating Vagueness: Rule-Following and the Scope of Trust" (forthcoming, The Philosophical Quarterly) focuses on trust in discretionary scenarios—situations where trustees must exercise judgment beyond explicitly defined expectations. I argue that these scenarios reveal an inherent vagueness in trusting relationships that often leads to disagreements between trustors and trustees about the scope of trust. After showing how current action-based and domain-based models fail to address these problems, I propose and defend my relational framework. This solution shifts the object of trust from particular actions to adherence to norms constitutive of relationships, and proposes that disagreements over the enactment of those norms can be resolved through communication and engaged practice.
The second, "'I Trust You!' Sure, But With What? Understanding Broad Trust" (under reivew), examines the phenomenon of broad trust—instances where we trust someone in open-ended ways that seem unconditional yet clearly have implicit terms and limits. Broad trust includes both trust across domains (like trusting your mechanic with car repairs) and general trust (like infant trust or trust in God), contrasted with action-specific trust. I argue that current accounts fail to capture this phenomenon adequately, as they cannot explain how trust can feel unconditional while maintaining clear boundaries. My relational framework resolves this apparent tension by showing that when we say, "I trust you," the "you" implies their participation in the relationship, while the relationship's normative content provides the particular expectations and limits.
Finally, the third paper, "Breaking Trust: Relocating Reactive Feelings" (forthcoming, Episteme), challenges the prevalent view that reactive feelings such as betrayal and personal disappointment are inherent to trust. I argue instead that trust is a fully doxastic phenomenon that fundamentally consists in the belief that the trustee will follow the norms constitutive of the relationship. Violations of trust, therefore, directly call only for epistemic reassessment of the trustee's trustworthiness. I demonstrate that reactive feelings are better understood as responses to relationship impairments rather than trust violations. What warrants reactive feelings is not the mere fact of trust being broken, but whether the violation reveals a disregard for the relationship itself. This relocation of reactive attitudes to the relationship sheds light on why some breaches warrant feelings of betrayal while others warrant mere disappointment, depending on how the violation affects the relationship's integrity.
My dissertation, "A Relational Theory of Trust," exemplifies this theoretical commitment by demonstrating how relationships not only provide the context for trust but fundamentally constitute its normative content. Drawing on Joseph Raz's work on social norms, I argue that relationships are constituted by norms: ways in which we are committed to acting with each other as fellow participants. Trust, thus, implies a belief that our trustees will follow through with such norms, rather than aiming at particular actions. This theory, developed across three stand-alone papers that together form my dissertation, addresses various issues in the trust literature.
The first, "Navigating Vagueness: Rule-Following and the Scope of Trust" (forthcoming, The Philosophical Quarterly) focuses on trust in discretionary scenarios—situations where trustees must exercise judgment beyond explicitly defined expectations. I argue that these scenarios reveal an inherent vagueness in trusting relationships that often leads to disagreements between trustors and trustees about the scope of trust. After showing how current action-based and domain-based models fail to address these problems, I propose and defend my relational framework. This solution shifts the object of trust from particular actions to adherence to norms constitutive of relationships, and proposes that disagreements over the enactment of those norms can be resolved through communication and engaged practice.
The second, "'I Trust You!' Sure, But With What? Understanding Broad Trust" (under reivew), examines the phenomenon of broad trust—instances where we trust someone in open-ended ways that seem unconditional yet clearly have implicit terms and limits. Broad trust includes both trust across domains (like trusting your mechanic with car repairs) and general trust (like infant trust or trust in God), contrasted with action-specific trust. I argue that current accounts fail to capture this phenomenon adequately, as they cannot explain how trust can feel unconditional while maintaining clear boundaries. My relational framework resolves this apparent tension by showing that when we say, "I trust you," the "you" implies their participation in the relationship, while the relationship's normative content provides the particular expectations and limits.
Finally, the third paper, "Breaking Trust: Relocating Reactive Feelings" (forthcoming, Episteme), challenges the prevalent view that reactive feelings such as betrayal and personal disappointment are inherent to trust. I argue instead that trust is a fully doxastic phenomenon that fundamentally consists in the belief that the trustee will follow the norms constitutive of the relationship. Violations of trust, therefore, directly call only for epistemic reassessment of the trustee's trustworthiness. I demonstrate that reactive feelings are better understood as responses to relationship impairments rather than trust violations. What warrants reactive feelings is not the mere fact of trust being broken, but whether the violation reveals a disregard for the relationship itself. This relocation of reactive attitudes to the relationship sheds light on why some breaches warrant feelings of betrayal while others warrant mere disappointment, depending on how the violation affects the relationship's integrity.
(1) Political (Dis)Trust and its Challenges to Democracy
My current project focuses on trust in the political domain, spanning three core chapters and projects. In "Civic Trust and Democratic Horizontal Relationships," I examine the claim advanced by Benedict Anderson and Michele Moody-Adams that democratic societies require cooperation through horizontal relationships between citizens. I contend that civic trust operates through established norms such as civility, reciprocity, respect for particular democratic procedures, and a shared societal ethos. This framework helps explain both why cooperation between citizens is so fragile and why its breakdown is so damaging to liberal democracies. When citizens begin to see their fellow citizens as fundamentally uncommitted to democratic norms, the relationship begins to dissolve, which in turn undermines trust. I particularly focus on political polarization, claiming that it represents not only fundamental disagreement but reflects a deeper breakdown in how citizens regard one another as fellow participants.
In "The Personalization of Politics and Institutional Trust," I address how contemporary democracies have become increasingly centered around individual leaders (such as Trumpism in the U.S. and Bibism in Israel) rather than parties, ideologies, or social agendas. We lack a clear normative framework for evaluating the consequences of this shift for democratic governance and civic cooperation. In the paper, I argue against the personalization of politics by exploring the differential emotional dynamics of personal and impersonal political trust. I contend that trust in personal political relationships is inherently more susceptible to emotional influence than when employed in impersonal relationships grounded in competence and dependency-responsiveness. The personalization of politics therefore encourages emotional partisanship and irrational behavior, weakening the conditions necessary for cooperation among citizens. Through contrast with John Rawls's veil of ignorance, I articulate an ideal of impersonal political engagement that values competence and effectiveness over identity.
Finally, "Trust Among the Nations" turns my discussion of trust to countries and political communities. Global challenges require cooperation between countries, which is best achieved by forming significant trusting relationships between nations. I argue that shared norms, established formally through international law and trade agreements, as well as informally through cultural exchanges, are necessary to establish robust trusting relationships that are resistant to changes in governance. This requirement of normative alignment shows why international relations evolve more easily and effectively between nations that already share fundamental values and temperament. It also suggests that to expand the global community, participants that differ substantially in their values may need to first undergo significant internal changes, as attempts to artificially establish a global community may result in absurdities or depend on the affinity of individual leaders.
My current project focuses on trust in the political domain, spanning three core chapters and projects. In "Civic Trust and Democratic Horizontal Relationships," I examine the claim advanced by Benedict Anderson and Michele Moody-Adams that democratic societies require cooperation through horizontal relationships between citizens. I contend that civic trust operates through established norms such as civility, reciprocity, respect for particular democratic procedures, and a shared societal ethos. This framework helps explain both why cooperation between citizens is so fragile and why its breakdown is so damaging to liberal democracies. When citizens begin to see their fellow citizens as fundamentally uncommitted to democratic norms, the relationship begins to dissolve, which in turn undermines trust. I particularly focus on political polarization, claiming that it represents not only fundamental disagreement but reflects a deeper breakdown in how citizens regard one another as fellow participants.
In "The Personalization of Politics and Institutional Trust," I address how contemporary democracies have become increasingly centered around individual leaders (such as Trumpism in the U.S. and Bibism in Israel) rather than parties, ideologies, or social agendas. We lack a clear normative framework for evaluating the consequences of this shift for democratic governance and civic cooperation. In the paper, I argue against the personalization of politics by exploring the differential emotional dynamics of personal and impersonal political trust. I contend that trust in personal political relationships is inherently more susceptible to emotional influence than when employed in impersonal relationships grounded in competence and dependency-responsiveness. The personalization of politics therefore encourages emotional partisanship and irrational behavior, weakening the conditions necessary for cooperation among citizens. Through contrast with John Rawls's veil of ignorance, I articulate an ideal of impersonal political engagement that values competence and effectiveness over identity.
Finally, "Trust Among the Nations" turns my discussion of trust to countries and political communities. Global challenges require cooperation between countries, which is best achieved by forming significant trusting relationships between nations. I argue that shared norms, established formally through international law and trade agreements, as well as informally through cultural exchanges, are necessary to establish robust trusting relationships that are resistant to changes in governance. This requirement of normative alignment shows why international relations evolve more easily and effectively between nations that already share fundamental values and temperament. It also suggests that to expand the global community, participants that differ substantially in their values may need to first undergo significant internal changes, as attempts to artificially establish a global community may result in absurdities or depend on the affinity of individual leaders.
(2) Sexual Ethics and Consent
My work on consent explores urgent concerns of the post-#MeToo era, emphasizing the obligations of consent-receivers and thinking of what men can do to be more ethical partners in heyeronormative relationships.
In "Caring for Valid Sexual Consent" (Hypatia, 2025), I argue that valid consent requires justified trust in the consent-receiver to act only within the scope of consent. Drawing on Katherine Hawley's commitment account of trust, I establish what I call the Trust Condition—a belief that the consent-receiver is capable and willing to act as expected. Due to the non-contractual dimensions of sexual activity—including the dynamic nature of sexual desires and the absence of external factors binding partners to consent terms—I argue that trust in sexual contexts is warranted through care, defined as special sensitivity and attention toward a partner's will.
In "Do You Mind Violating My Will?" (forthcoming in Routledge's The Philosophy of Sexual Violence), I discuss a subset of preferences in which a person wants the violation of a desire they chose to make effective, as it arguably happens in rape fantasies. I argue that such cases provide us with a unique insight into personal autonomy from a proceduralist standpoint. Proceduralists, such as Frankfurt and Dworkin, defend a liberal and content-neutral approach, in which autonomy entails the agent's endorsement of the desires that move her actions. I analyze some examples in light of Frankfurt's endorsement theory and argue that even while we cannot endorse a practical decision we want to be violated, we nonetheless regard those cases (under certain conditions) as blatantly autonomous. Therefore, autonomy does not necessarily require endorsement. Instead, I propose that the nature of the relevant highest-order volition dictates what procedure should be established in one's desire structure for its fulfillment. I also discuss how the agent may effectively consent to the violation of their will and propose a practical tool that signals shifts in the normative context.
My "The Path to Epistemic Courage: Considering Non-Deontic Positive Norms" (prepared for the Journal of Philosophy of Emotion) engages with Jonathan Ichikawa's Epistemic Courage (OUP, 2024) to explore the intersection of epistemology and feminist ethics. I argue that Ichikawa's framing of positive epistemic norms exclusively in deontic terms overlooks an important distinction between beliefs we are required to hold and those that would be good but not required. Through examining his discussion of testimonies of sexual violence, I demonstrate how epistemic courage as a virtue must accommodate both what justice requires us to believe and what goes beyond duty. This work shows how believing victims' testimonies involves not just obligatory responses, but also supererogatory epistemic virtues when engaging with distant testimonies that nonetheless contribute to combating rape culture.
This work extends beyond academia through participation in research networks influencing public discourse and policy on sexual ethics in digital spaces and sex-positive communities, serving as a research fellow as in the “Ethical Dating Online” (University of Leeds) and the Center for Positive Sexuality.
My work on consent explores urgent concerns of the post-#MeToo era, emphasizing the obligations of consent-receivers and thinking of what men can do to be more ethical partners in heyeronormative relationships.
In "Caring for Valid Sexual Consent" (Hypatia, 2025), I argue that valid consent requires justified trust in the consent-receiver to act only within the scope of consent. Drawing on Katherine Hawley's commitment account of trust, I establish what I call the Trust Condition—a belief that the consent-receiver is capable and willing to act as expected. Due to the non-contractual dimensions of sexual activity—including the dynamic nature of sexual desires and the absence of external factors binding partners to consent terms—I argue that trust in sexual contexts is warranted through care, defined as special sensitivity and attention toward a partner's will.
In "Do You Mind Violating My Will?" (forthcoming in Routledge's The Philosophy of Sexual Violence), I discuss a subset of preferences in which a person wants the violation of a desire they chose to make effective, as it arguably happens in rape fantasies. I argue that such cases provide us with a unique insight into personal autonomy from a proceduralist standpoint. Proceduralists, such as Frankfurt and Dworkin, defend a liberal and content-neutral approach, in which autonomy entails the agent's endorsement of the desires that move her actions. I analyze some examples in light of Frankfurt's endorsement theory and argue that even while we cannot endorse a practical decision we want to be violated, we nonetheless regard those cases (under certain conditions) as blatantly autonomous. Therefore, autonomy does not necessarily require endorsement. Instead, I propose that the nature of the relevant highest-order volition dictates what procedure should be established in one's desire structure for its fulfillment. I also discuss how the agent may effectively consent to the violation of their will and propose a practical tool that signals shifts in the normative context.
My "The Path to Epistemic Courage: Considering Non-Deontic Positive Norms" (prepared for the Journal of Philosophy of Emotion) engages with Jonathan Ichikawa's Epistemic Courage (OUP, 2024) to explore the intersection of epistemology and feminist ethics. I argue that Ichikawa's framing of positive epistemic norms exclusively in deontic terms overlooks an important distinction between beliefs we are required to hold and those that would be good but not required. Through examining his discussion of testimonies of sexual violence, I demonstrate how epistemic courage as a virtue must accommodate both what justice requires us to believe and what goes beyond duty. This work shows how believing victims' testimonies involves not just obligatory responses, but also supererogatory epistemic virtues when engaging with distant testimonies that nonetheless contribute to combating rape culture.
This work extends beyond academia through participation in research networks influencing public discourse and policy on sexual ethics in digital spaces and sex-positive communities, serving as a research fellow as in the “Ethical Dating Online” (University of Leeds) and the Center for Positive Sexuality.
(3) Kant’s Practical Philosophy
My engagement with Kantian philosophy represents a parallel research trajectory, where I aim to bring the history of philosophy into dialogue with contemporary normative questions. "A Kantian Account of Moral Trust" (forthcoming in Kantian Review), which received the 2024 North American Kant Society's Markus Herz Essay Prize, proposes a Kantian framework for moral trust—trust in another person to act only in morally permissible ways. I derive an understanding of trustworthiness from Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative, arguing that trustworthiness embodies a moral imperative guiding us to act in ways that are reliable and recognizable as conducive to trusting relations. The paper explores a basis for assessing moral conduct through a local version of the Kingdom of Ends: given an ideal archetype of a morally perfect interpersonal relationship, we can comparatively assess the moral disposition of fellow agents.
Kant was my first philosophical interest and the focus of my work during my master’s at the Hebrew University. "On Moral Perfection: An Atemporal Reading of Kant's Postulate of Immortality" (forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy), winner of the Nordev Essay Prize, was adapted from my Master's thesis, offers a novel interpretation of Kant's postulate of immortality from the Critique of Practical Reason. I argue that immortality should be understood as an atemporal state in which the moral agent, freed from sensibility, is purely rational. This reading addresses a fundamental problem in Kant's moral psychology: how can moral perfection serve as a motivating ideal when our sensible nature makes it unattainable in this life? Drawing on Kant's "The End of All Things," I demonstrate that his eschatological depiction provides the necessary grounds for moral motivation by showing how moral perfection becomes possible through transcending our temporal, sensible existence. This account resolves the apparent tension between Kant's maximalist demand for moral perfection as a necessary rational end and the impossibility of achieving it within our sensible condition, thus preserving its motivational role in Kant's practical philosophy.
For abstracts of the papers discussed above, please visit my Publications page, or explore my current projects under Under Review and In Preparation.
My engagement with Kantian philosophy represents a parallel research trajectory, where I aim to bring the history of philosophy into dialogue with contemporary normative questions. "A Kantian Account of Moral Trust" (forthcoming in Kantian Review), which received the 2024 North American Kant Society's Markus Herz Essay Prize, proposes a Kantian framework for moral trust—trust in another person to act only in morally permissible ways. I derive an understanding of trustworthiness from Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative, arguing that trustworthiness embodies a moral imperative guiding us to act in ways that are reliable and recognizable as conducive to trusting relations. The paper explores a basis for assessing moral conduct through a local version of the Kingdom of Ends: given an ideal archetype of a morally perfect interpersonal relationship, we can comparatively assess the moral disposition of fellow agents.
Kant was my first philosophical interest and the focus of my work during my master’s at the Hebrew University. "On Moral Perfection: An Atemporal Reading of Kant's Postulate of Immortality" (forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy), winner of the Nordev Essay Prize, was adapted from my Master's thesis, offers a novel interpretation of Kant's postulate of immortality from the Critique of Practical Reason. I argue that immortality should be understood as an atemporal state in which the moral agent, freed from sensibility, is purely rational. This reading addresses a fundamental problem in Kant's moral psychology: how can moral perfection serve as a motivating ideal when our sensible nature makes it unattainable in this life? Drawing on Kant's "The End of All Things," I demonstrate that his eschatological depiction provides the necessary grounds for moral motivation by showing how moral perfection becomes possible through transcending our temporal, sensible existence. This account resolves the apparent tension between Kant's maximalist demand for moral perfection as a necessary rational end and the impossibility of achieving it within our sensible condition, thus preserving its motivational role in Kant's practical philosophy.
For abstracts of the papers discussed above, please visit my Publications page, or explore my current projects under Under Review and In Preparation.