Under Review (Titles redacted for review. Drafts available upon request)
A paper on broad trust
When I tell my partner "I trust you" without qualification, I experience this trust as open-ended, yet I understand it has specific terms. I call this phenomenon Broad Trust (BT) and argue that it poses significant challenges for current philosophical accounts of trust, which inadequately explain its distinctive phenomenology and scope. In this paper, I apply a relational account of trust to explain BT. In this view, to trust someone is to rely on them to follow the norms constitutive of our relationship. This framework explains why BT feels unconditional despite having implicit limits: when I say "I trust you," the "you" is relationally contextualized, addressing the person as a participant in our shared normative framework. The relational account explains how BT spans multiple domains while remaining bounded, accounts for apparently unconditional cases like infant trust through complete overlap between trustor interests and relationship scope, and explains varying expectations across similar relationship types.
When I tell my partner "I trust you" without qualification, I experience this trust as open-ended, yet I understand it has specific terms. I call this phenomenon Broad Trust (BT) and argue that it poses significant challenges for current philosophical accounts of trust, which inadequately explain its distinctive phenomenology and scope. In this paper, I apply a relational account of trust to explain BT. In this view, to trust someone is to rely on them to follow the norms constitutive of our relationship. This framework explains why BT feels unconditional despite having implicit limits: when I say "I trust you," the "you" is relationally contextualized, addressing the person as a participant in our shared normative framework. The relational account explains how BT spans multiple domains while remaining bounded, accounts for apparently unconditional cases like infant trust through complete overlap between trustor interests and relationship scope, and explains varying expectations across similar relationship types.
A paper on consent [APA handout]
In this paper, I argue we should rethink the way consent operates in our lives. Consent is commonly thought to have a special “normative power.” The notion of normative powers has been widely used in philosophy to describe an agent's ability to create and rescind normative requirements at will. In the context of consent theory, normative powers supposedly perform a “moral magic” (Hurd 1996, 144), giving agents the ability to waive rights, thereby neutralizing the wrongfulness inherent in the non-consensual counterpart actions. I argue against the normative-powers view by describing scenarios where there's valid consent, but the relevant action fails to become consensual. My central claim is that consensual and non-consensual acts differ fundamentally in kind, not merely in their permissibility. Drawing on insights from feminist theory—which has long contested the harmful assumption that rape is simply “sex without consent”—and the related ditinction from action theory between events (the physical occurrence) and actions (what the agent does, driven by their will, intentions, and reasons), arguing that consensual and non-consensual versions have different intentional structures and moral properties. Instead of a normative power, I propose that consent plays a practical modal role—when validly given, it opens the possibility of new avenues of action that were previously unavailable, but those actions still require proper realization by the consent-receiver. This reconceptualization of consent offers a more parsimonious view of moral agency that doesn't rely on problematic mind-dependent duties, and practically reframes moral responsibility by placing focus on what the consent-receiver actually does with the consent offered.
In this paper, I argue we should rethink the way consent operates in our lives. Consent is commonly thought to have a special “normative power.” The notion of normative powers has been widely used in philosophy to describe an agent's ability to create and rescind normative requirements at will. In the context of consent theory, normative powers supposedly perform a “moral magic” (Hurd 1996, 144), giving agents the ability to waive rights, thereby neutralizing the wrongfulness inherent in the non-consensual counterpart actions. I argue against the normative-powers view by describing scenarios where there's valid consent, but the relevant action fails to become consensual. My central claim is that consensual and non-consensual acts differ fundamentally in kind, not merely in their permissibility. Drawing on insights from feminist theory—which has long contested the harmful assumption that rape is simply “sex without consent”—and the related ditinction from action theory between events (the physical occurrence) and actions (what the agent does, driven by their will, intentions, and reasons), arguing that consensual and non-consensual versions have different intentional structures and moral properties. Instead of a normative power, I propose that consent plays a practical modal role—when validly given, it opens the possibility of new avenues of action that were previously unavailable, but those actions still require proper realization by the consent-receiver. This reconceptualization of consent offers a more parsimonious view of moral agency that doesn't rely on problematic mind-dependent duties, and practically reframes moral responsibility by placing focus on what the consent-receiver actually does with the consent offered.
Work in Progress (happy to talk about these)
DTR, or: Define (The) Relationship
Much has been written in moral philosophy about what relationships entail, justify, or accommodate, but too little about what they are. In this paper, I discuss two views: the agent-centered view, represented by Kolodny, which take relationships to be individuated by participants' identities, and the norm-centered view, represented by Raz, which understands relationships as constituted by the norms that guide the participants’ interactions with each other. With significant limitations to both, I propose a hybrid view, suggesting that relationships are constituted by norms that become normatively binding through one's commitment to particular others, whether through acceptance or authority. I argue this framework can potentially accommodate the full spectrum of relationships one may have, from the intimate to the civic, and is a promising solution for capturing both the normative character of relationships as well as their deep second-person nature.
Much has been written in moral philosophy about what relationships entail, justify, or accommodate, but too little about what they are. In this paper, I discuss two views: the agent-centered view, represented by Kolodny, which take relationships to be individuated by participants' identities, and the norm-centered view, represented by Raz, which understands relationships as constituted by the norms that guide the participants’ interactions with each other. With significant limitations to both, I propose a hybrid view, suggesting that relationships are constituted by norms that become normatively binding through one's commitment to particular others, whether through acceptance or authority. I argue this framework can potentially accommodate the full spectrum of relationships one may have, from the intimate to the civic, and is a promising solution for capturing both the normative character of relationships as well as their deep second-person nature.
Democratic Betrayal (w/ Jack Madock)
Democratic governments have recently been implicated in violations of democratic norms both domestically and abroad. These violations constitute a special type of betrayal by government officials. This paper argues that betrayal of citizens by democratic politicians is of special interest to ethics, political philosophy and philosophy of trust. We argue that betrayal by democratic politicians is both strong and distinct from everyday interpersonal betrayal for three reasons. First, drawing on Katherine Hawley’s claim that failures of trustworthiness occur either by incompetence or insincerity, we argue that democratic betrayal constitutes a failure of sincerity. Katherine Hawley has argued that failure of trustworthiness can occur either by incompetence or insincerity. We first show that failure or insincerity is, other things equal, morally worse than failure of competence as it shows a disregard for the trustor. We then argue that failures by government officials are almost always due to insincerity. Second, we argue that democratic betrayal violates the individual's political agency by hijacking it to perform acts that do not conform with their goals and plans. Insofar as political agents express the wills of those that they govern, failure to act in accordance with the desires of the people thus constitutes a special type of harm, as a violation of political autonomy. Finally, democratic betrayal leaves individuals without recourse to withdraw their vulnerability. In normal interpersonal circumstances, when one is betrayed (perhaps multiple times) they can withdraw their vulnerability. Due to the nature of politically organized societies, the withdrawal of vulnerability is rarely an option in response to betrayal.
Democratic governments have recently been implicated in violations of democratic norms both domestically and abroad. These violations constitute a special type of betrayal by government officials. This paper argues that betrayal of citizens by democratic politicians is of special interest to ethics, political philosophy and philosophy of trust. We argue that betrayal by democratic politicians is both strong and distinct from everyday interpersonal betrayal for three reasons. First, drawing on Katherine Hawley’s claim that failures of trustworthiness occur either by incompetence or insincerity, we argue that democratic betrayal constitutes a failure of sincerity. Katherine Hawley has argued that failure of trustworthiness can occur either by incompetence or insincerity. We first show that failure or insincerity is, other things equal, morally worse than failure of competence as it shows a disregard for the trustor. We then argue that failures by government officials are almost always due to insincerity. Second, we argue that democratic betrayal violates the individual's political agency by hijacking it to perform acts that do not conform with their goals and plans. Insofar as political agents express the wills of those that they govern, failure to act in accordance with the desires of the people thus constitutes a special type of harm, as a violation of political autonomy. Finally, democratic betrayal leaves individuals without recourse to withdraw their vulnerability. In normal interpersonal circumstances, when one is betrayed (perhaps multiple times) they can withdraw their vulnerability. Due to the nature of politically organized societies, the withdrawal of vulnerability is rarely an option in response to betrayal.
Civic Trust and Democratic Horizontal Relationships
In this paper, I examine the claim advanced by Benedict Anderson and Michele Moody-Adams that democratic societies require cooperation through “horizontal relationships” between citizens. This sounds right, but they offer little explanation of what such civic cooperation consists of. I suggest the answer lies in civic trust. I contend that civic trust operates through established norms such as civility, reciprocity, respect for particular democratic procedures, and a shared societal ethos. This framework helps explain both why cooperation between citizens is so fragile and why its breakdown is so damaging to liberal democracies. When citizens begin to see their fellow citizens as fundamentally uncommitted to democratic norms, the relationship begins to dissolve, which in turn undermines trust. This framework offers new insight into contemporary challenges facing liberal democracies. I particularly focus on political polarization, claiming that it represents not only fundamental disagreement but reflects a deeper breakdown in how citizens regard one another as fellow participants in the same political entity.
In this paper, I examine the claim advanced by Benedict Anderson and Michele Moody-Adams that democratic societies require cooperation through “horizontal relationships” between citizens. This sounds right, but they offer little explanation of what such civic cooperation consists of. I suggest the answer lies in civic trust. I contend that civic trust operates through established norms such as civility, reciprocity, respect for particular democratic procedures, and a shared societal ethos. This framework helps explain both why cooperation between citizens is so fragile and why its breakdown is so damaging to liberal democracies. When citizens begin to see their fellow citizens as fundamentally uncommitted to democratic norms, the relationship begins to dissolve, which in turn undermines trust. This framework offers new insight into contemporary challenges facing liberal democracies. I particularly focus on political polarization, claiming that it represents not only fundamental disagreement but reflects a deeper breakdown in how citizens regard one another as fellow participants in the same political entity.
The Personalization of Politics and Institutional Distrust
This paper addresses how contemporary democracies (or what's left of them) have become increasingly centered around individual leaders (e.g., Trumpism in the U.S., Bibism in Israel) rather than parties, ideologies, or social agendas, yet we lack a clear normative framework for evaluating the consequences of this shift for democratic governance and civic cooperation. In the paper, I argue against the personalization of politics by exploring the differential emotional dynamics of personal and impersonal political trust. I contend that trust in personal political relationships (centered on individual leaders) is inherently more susceptible to emotional influence than when employed in impersonal relationships grounded in competence and dependency-responsiveness. The personalization of politics therefore encourages emotional partisanship and irrational behavior, weakening the conditions necessary for cooperation among citizens. Through contrast with John Rawls's veil of ignorance, I articulate an ideal of impersonal political engagement that values competence and effectiveness over identity.
This paper addresses how contemporary democracies (or what's left of them) have become increasingly centered around individual leaders (e.g., Trumpism in the U.S., Bibism in Israel) rather than parties, ideologies, or social agendas, yet we lack a clear normative framework for evaluating the consequences of this shift for democratic governance and civic cooperation. In the paper, I argue against the personalization of politics by exploring the differential emotional dynamics of personal and impersonal political trust. I contend that trust in personal political relationships (centered on individual leaders) is inherently more susceptible to emotional influence than when employed in impersonal relationships grounded in competence and dependency-responsiveness. The personalization of politics therefore encourages emotional partisanship and irrational behavior, weakening the conditions necessary for cooperation among citizens. Through contrast with John Rawls's veil of ignorance, I articulate an ideal of impersonal political engagement that values competence and effectiveness over identity.
Trust Among the Nations
Global challenges from climate change to international security require cooperation between countries. It is widely agreed that such cooperation is best achieved by forming significant trusting relationships between nations. In this paper, I argue that shared norms—through formal means such as international law, trade agreements, and diplomatic protocols, but also informally through interpersonal or cultural exchanges between citizens—are necessary to establish robust trusting relationships, resistant to changes in governance. This requirement of normative alignment shows why international relations evolve more easily and effectively between nations that already share fundamental values and temperament. More importantly, it suggests that to expand the global community and allow for broader cooperation, participants that differ substantially in their values may need to first undergo significant internal changes. Without such internal changes, attempts to artificially establish a global community may result in absurdities, such as Saudi Arabia’s (a country that systematically discriminates against women) leadership of the UN women’s rights committee, or depend on the affinity of individual (and often corrupt) leaders.
Global challenges from climate change to international security require cooperation between countries. It is widely agreed that such cooperation is best achieved by forming significant trusting relationships between nations. In this paper, I argue that shared norms—through formal means such as international law, trade agreements, and diplomatic protocols, but also informally through interpersonal or cultural exchanges between citizens—are necessary to establish robust trusting relationships, resistant to changes in governance. This requirement of normative alignment shows why international relations evolve more easily and effectively between nations that already share fundamental values and temperament. More importantly, it suggests that to expand the global community and allow for broader cooperation, participants that differ substantially in their values may need to first undergo significant internal changes. Without such internal changes, attempts to artificially establish a global community may result in absurdities, such as Saudi Arabia’s (a country that systematically discriminates against women) leadership of the UN women’s rights committee, or depend on the affinity of individual (and often corrupt) leaders.