Under Review (Titles redacted for review. Drafts available upon request)
A paper on Kant's postulate of immortality (R&R at The European Journal of Philosophy)
In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of Kant's postulate of immortality from the Critique of Practical Reason. Contrary to other interpretations, I argue that immortality should be understood as an atemporal state in which the moral agent, freed from sensibility, is purely rational. Drawing on Kant's discussion in “The End of All Things,” I contend that the eschatological depiction Kant presents in this text is consistent with the postulate's aspirations for establishing subjective grounds for moral perfection, rather than signaling a change in his view. This account addresses both a philosophical and historical gap, providing content to the postulate of immortality that coheres with its moral aims and demonstrates Kant's consistent understanding of the afterlife across his works.
In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of Kant's postulate of immortality from the Critique of Practical Reason. Contrary to other interpretations, I argue that immortality should be understood as an atemporal state in which the moral agent, freed from sensibility, is purely rational. Drawing on Kant's discussion in “The End of All Things,” I contend that the eschatological depiction Kant presents in this text is consistent with the postulate's aspirations for establishing subjective grounds for moral perfection, rather than signaling a change in his view. This account addresses both a philosophical and historical gap, providing content to the postulate of immortality that coheres with its moral aims and demonstrates Kant's consistent understanding of the afterlife across his works.
A paper on trust violations and reactive feelings [handout]
In this paper, I argue that reactive feelings such as betrayal and personal disappointment are not inherent to the attitude of trust. Instead, such feelings are better understood as responses to impairments in relationships. Trust, I propose, is a fully doxastic mechanism that fundamentally consists of the belief that the trustee will follow through the norms constitutive of the relationship, such that a breach of trust directly calls only for an epistemic reassessment of the trustee’s trustworthiness. I further show that what warrants reactive feelings is not the mere fact of trust being broken, but whether through the violation of trust, the person reveals a disregard for the relationship.
In this paper, I argue that reactive feelings such as betrayal and personal disappointment are not inherent to the attitude of trust. Instead, such feelings are better understood as responses to impairments in relationships. Trust, I propose, is a fully doxastic mechanism that fundamentally consists of the belief that the trustee will follow through the norms constitutive of the relationship, such that a breach of trust directly calls only for an epistemic reassessment of the trustee’s trustworthiness. I further show that what warrants reactive feelings is not the mere fact of trust being broken, but whether through the violation of trust, the person reveals a disregard for the relationship.
Work in Progress (happy to talk about these)
'I Trust You!' Sure, But With What? Understanding Broad Trust
When I tell my partner "I trust you" without qualification, I experience this trust as open-ended, yet I understand it has specific terms. I call this phenomenon Broad Trust (BT) and argue that it poses significant challenges for current philosophical accounts of trust, which inadequately explain its distinctive phenomenology and scope. In this paper, I apply a relational account of trust to explain BT. In this view, to trust someone is to rely on them to follow the norms constitutive of our relationship. This framework explains why BT feels unconditional despite having implicit limits: when I say "I trust you," the "you" is relationally contextualized, addressing the person as a participant in our shared normative framework. The relational account explains how BT spans multiple domains while remaining bounded, accounts for apparently unconditional cases like infant trust through complete overlap between trustor interests and relationship scope, and explains varying expectations across similar relationship types.
When I tell my partner "I trust you" without qualification, I experience this trust as open-ended, yet I understand it has specific terms. I call this phenomenon Broad Trust (BT) and argue that it poses significant challenges for current philosophical accounts of trust, which inadequately explain its distinctive phenomenology and scope. In this paper, I apply a relational account of trust to explain BT. In this view, to trust someone is to rely on them to follow the norms constitutive of our relationship. This framework explains why BT feels unconditional despite having implicit limits: when I say "I trust you," the "you" is relationally contextualized, addressing the person as a participant in our shared normative framework. The relational account explains how BT spans multiple domains while remaining bounded, accounts for apparently unconditional cases like infant trust through complete overlap between trustor interests and relationship scope, and explains varying expectations across similar relationship types.
DTR, or: Define (The) Relationship
Much has been written in moral philosophy about what relationships entail, justify, or accommodate, but too little about what they are. In this paper, I discuss two views: the agent-centered view, represented by Kolodny, which take relationships to be individuated by participants' identities, and the norm-centered view, represented by Raz, which understands relationships as constituted by the norms that guide the participants’ interactions with each other. With significant limitations to both, I propose a hybrid view, suggesting that relationships are constituted by norms that become normatively binding through one's commitment to particular others, whether through acceptance or authority. I argue this framework can potentially accommodate the full spectrum of relationships one may have, from the intimate to the civic, and is a promising solution for capturing both the normative character of relationships as well as their deep second-person nature.
Much has been written in moral philosophy about what relationships entail, justify, or accommodate, but too little about what they are. In this paper, I discuss two views: the agent-centered view, represented by Kolodny, which take relationships to be individuated by participants' identities, and the norm-centered view, represented by Raz, which understands relationships as constituted by the norms that guide the participants’ interactions with each other. With significant limitations to both, I propose a hybrid view, suggesting that relationships are constituted by norms that become normatively binding through one's commitment to particular others, whether through acceptance or authority. I argue this framework can potentially accommodate the full spectrum of relationships one may have, from the intimate to the civic, and is a promising solution for capturing both the normative character of relationships as well as their deep second-person nature.
Demystifying Consent
n this paper, I argue we should rethink the way consent operates in our lives. Consent is commonly thought to have a special “normative power.” The notion of normative powers has been widely used in philosophy to describe an agent's ability to create and rescind normative requirements at will. In the context of consent theory, normative powers supposedly perform a “moral magic” (Hurd 1996, 144), giving agents the ability to waive rights, thereby neutralizing the wrongfulness inherent in the non-consensual counterpart actions. I argue against the normative-powers view by describing scenarios where there's valid consent, but the relevant action fails to become consensual. My central claim is that consensual and non-consensual acts differ fundamentally in kind, not merely in their permissibility. Drawing on insights from feminist theory—which has long contested the harmful assumption that rape is simply “sex without consent”—and the related ditinction from action theory between events (the physical occurrence) and actions (what the agent does, driven by their will, intentions, and reasons), arguing that consensual and non-consensual versions have different intentional structures and moral properties. Instead of a normative power, I propose that consent plays a practical modal role—when validly given, it opens the possibility of new avenues of action that were previously unavailable, but those actions still require proper realization by the consent-receiver. This reconceptualization of consent offers a more parsimonious view of moral agency that doesn't rely on problematic mind-dependent duties, and practically reframes moral responsibility by placing focus on what the consent-receiver actually does with the consent offered.
n this paper, I argue we should rethink the way consent operates in our lives. Consent is commonly thought to have a special “normative power.” The notion of normative powers has been widely used in philosophy to describe an agent's ability to create and rescind normative requirements at will. In the context of consent theory, normative powers supposedly perform a “moral magic” (Hurd 1996, 144), giving agents the ability to waive rights, thereby neutralizing the wrongfulness inherent in the non-consensual counterpart actions. I argue against the normative-powers view by describing scenarios where there's valid consent, but the relevant action fails to become consensual. My central claim is that consensual and non-consensual acts differ fundamentally in kind, not merely in their permissibility. Drawing on insights from feminist theory—which has long contested the harmful assumption that rape is simply “sex without consent”—and the related ditinction from action theory between events (the physical occurrence) and actions (what the agent does, driven by their will, intentions, and reasons), arguing that consensual and non-consensual versions have different intentional structures and moral properties. Instead of a normative power, I propose that consent plays a practical modal role—when validly given, it opens the possibility of new avenues of action that were previously unavailable, but those actions still require proper realization by the consent-receiver. This reconceptualization of consent offers a more parsimonious view of moral agency that doesn't rely on problematic mind-dependent duties, and practically reframes moral responsibility by placing focus on what the consent-receiver actually does with the consent offered.