Publications
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Breaking Trust and Relocating Reactive Feelings
Forthcoming in the Episteme [penultimate] [final]
In this paper, I argue that reactive feelings such as betrayal and personal disappointment are not inherent to the attitude of trust. Instead, such feelings are better understood as responses to impairments in relationships. 

Navigating Vagueness: Rule-Following and The Scope of Trust
Forthcoming in the Philosophical Quarterly [penultimate] [final]​
In this paper, I argue vagueness about expectations is as an inherent feature of trusting relationships, often leading to disagreements between trustors and trustees. To resolve this, I propose a novel account of trust grounded in rule-following, shifting the object of trust from particular actions to adherence to rules constitutive of relationships, and providing a framework for understanding and minimizing disagreements through communication and engaged practice. 

On Moral Perfection: An Atemporal Reading of Kant's Postulate of Immortality
Forthcoming in the European Journal of Philosophy [penultimate] [final]
In this paper, I draw on Kant's late essay "The End of All Things" to offer a novel interpretation of Kant's postulate of immortality from the Critique of Practical Reason. I argue that immortality should be understood as an atemporal state in which the moral agent, freed from sensibility, is purely rational. This account  provides content to the postulate of immortality that coheres with its moral aims and demonstrates Kant's consistent understanding of the afterlife across his works.

Do You Mind Violating My Will?
Forthcoming in Routledge's The Philosophy of Sexual Violence [penultimate]
In this paper, I discuss a subset of preferences in which a person wants the violation of desire they chose to make effective, as in rape fantasies.  In the first part of my argument, I  argue, from a proceduralist standpoint, that  autonomy does not necessarily require endorsement, but  the nature of the relevant highest-order volition dictates what procedure should be established in one’s desire structure for its fulfillment. In the second part, I discuss how the agent may effectively consent to the violation of their will by signaling to their partners shifts in the normative context.

A Kantian Account of Moral Trust
Kantian Review 30 (2): 195-213. 2025. [penultimate]  [final] [talk handout]
In this paper, I propose a Kantian framework for moral trust—trust in another person to only act with us in morally permissible ways. First, I derive an understanding of trustworthiness from Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative. Then, I explore a basis for assessing their moral conduct that serves as an archetype of the morally trustworthy agent to whom we may compare the people we interact with.

Caring for Valid Sexual Consent
Hypatia 40 (2): 308-328. 2025. [penultimate] [final] [talk handout]​
In this paper, I argue that valid consent requires justified trust in the consent-receiver to act only within the scope of consent. I call this the Trust Condition (TC), drawing on Katherine Hawley’s commitment account of trust. TC constitutes a belief that the consent-receiver is capable and willing to act as we expect from them. After establishing TC, I explore its application in the sexual arena, asserting that due to the non-contractual dimensions of sexual activit, trust is warranted in sexual consent by means of care.

Dissertation

A Relational Theory of Trust
Temple University: May 2026. [penultimate]  [defense handout] 
In this dissertation, I explore the nature of trust and how relationships are not only the environment where trust arises and flourishes, but more importantly, they provide its normative content. Relationships, I argue following Joseph Raz, are constituted by norms—ways in which we are committed to acting with each other as fellow participants. Trust, thus, implies a belief that our trustees will follow through with such norms, rather than aiming at particular actions. This framework grants participants agency in both shaping their relationships and determining appropriate actions within them, illuminating central aspects of trust's phenomenology, including its characteristic second-personal character. Each chapter of this dissertation focuses on a different puzzle in the trust literature, demonstrating the advantages of thinking of trust through a relational lens: In the first chapter, "Navigating Vagueness: Rule-Following and The Scope of Trust," I account for trustee discretion when explicitly defined expectations cannot be met. In the second chapter, "'I Trust You!' Sure, But With What? Understanding Broad Trust," I examine the phenomenon of broad trust—instances where we trust someone in open-ended ways that seem unconditional yet clearly have implicit terms and limits. Finally, in the third chapter, "Breaking Trust and Relocating Reactive Feelings," I aim to understand why trust violations typically represent not merely local practical failures but disregard for the relationship as a whole.