ELI BENJAMIN ISRAEL
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  • Research
    • Publications
    • Under Review & In Preparation​
    • Sexual Ethics Circle
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  • Home
  • About
  • Research
    • Publications
    • Under Review & In Preparation​
    • Sexual Ethics Circle
  • Teaching
  • Public Philosophy
  • CV

Publications
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Navigating Vagueness: Rule-Following and The Scope of Trust
Forthcoming in the Philosophical Quarterly [penultimate] [final]​
In this paper, I address a fundamental challenge in the philosophy of trust: how to account for trustee discretion in scenarios that fall outside explicitly defined expectations. I argue that this challenge reveals vagueness as an inherent feature of trusting relationships, often leading to disagreements between trustors and trustees. To resolve this, I propose a novel account of trust grounded in rule-following, shifting the object of trust from particular actions to adherence to rules constitutive of relationships. This approach illuminates two types of vagueness: "knowledge-to" vagueness concerning trust's scope, and "knowledge-how" vagueness regarding appropriate actions within that scope. By focusing on relationships and their constitutive rules, my account provides a framework for understanding and minimizing disagreements through communication and engaged practice. It also sheds light on the dynamics of trust-related reactive attitudes, in particular, distinguishing between betrayal and mere disappointment.​
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A Kantian Account of Moral Trust
Forthcoming in Kantian Review [penultimate]  [final] [talk handout]
In this paper, I propose a Kantian framework for moral trust—trust in another person to only act with us in morally permissible ways. First, I derive an understanding of trustworthiness from Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative. I argue that trustworthiness embodies a moral imperative, guiding us to act in ways that are reliable and recognizable as conducive to engaging in trusting relations. However, this alone is not enough, as it doesn't provide a means to assess whether someone is truly committed to the moral law and thus morally trustworthy. Therefore, in the second part, I explore a basis for assessing their moral conduct found in a local version of the Kingdom of Ends: given an ideal or archetype of a morally perfect interpersonal relationship, an archetype of the morally trustworthy agent allows us to comparatively assess the moral disposition of fellow agents.
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Caring for Valid Sexual Consent
Forthcoming in Hypatia 
[penultimate] [final] [talk handout]​
When philosophers consider factors compromising autonomy in consent, they often focus solely on the consent-giver’s agential capacities, overlooking the impact of the consent-receiver’s conduct on the consensual character of the activity. In this paper, I argue that valid consent requires justified trust in the consent-receiver to act only within the scope of consent. I call this the Trust Condition (TC), drawing on Katherine Hawley’s commitment account of trust. TC constitutes a belief that the consent-receiver is capable and willing to act as we expect from them. If such trust is not warranted, I argue, consent lacks the appropriate normative grounds. After establishing TC, I explore its application in the sexual arena, asserting that due to the non-contractual dimensions of sexual activity — such as the dynamic nature of sexual desires and the absence of external factors effectively binding sexual partners to the terms of consent—trust is warranted in sexual consent by means of care. I define care as a special sensitivity and attention toward the partner’s will and discuss how this approach leads to safer intimate relationships in practice.​
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Do You Mind Violating My Will?
Forthcoming in Routledge's The Philosophy of Sexual Violence [penultimate]
In this paper, I discuss a subset of preferences in which a person wants the violation of desire they chose to make effective. I argue that such cases provides us with a unique insight into personal autonomy from a proceduralist standpoint. Proceduralists, such as Frankfurt and Dworkin, defend a liberal and content-neutral approach, in which autonomy entails the agent's endorsement of the desires that move her actions. In the first part of my argument, I analyze some examples in light of Frankfurt's endorsement theory and argue that even while we cannot endorse a practical decision we want to be violated, we nonetheless regard those cases (under certain conditions) as blatantly autonomous. Therefore, autonomy does not necessarily require endorsement. Instead, I propose that the nature of the relevant highest-order volition dictates what procedure should be established in one’s desire structure for its fulfillment. In the second part, I discuss how the agent may effectively consent to the violation of their decision by another person. Because ordinary consent refers to actions but fails to communicate one's higher-order desires or commitments, I propose a practical tool that accomplishes this by signaling shifts in the normative context agents interact.